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On October 13, 1982 President Reagan signed into law the Job 
Training Partnership Act to help unskilled and deficiently educated 
poor individuals to compete in the labor market. The law replaced 
the much maligned Comprehensive Employment and Training Act 
(GETA) and continued  albeit with substantially less funding  
federal efforts to provide training for the poor which began in 1961. 
Federally financed training assistance reflects a national consensus 
that many people fail in or are being failed by the labor market not 
only in recessions, but even in prosperous times. In mid-1987, 
during the fifth year of the recovery from the 1981-2 recession, over 
7 million Americans were unemployed. This represents the highest 
level of joblessness in a sustained recovery period since the end of 
the Great Depression a half century ago.
Those in Need
Thirty-three million people experienced labor market problems at 
some time during 1985. Some had multiple difficulties: 21 million 
suffered unemployment, 14 million worked part time because they 
could not find full-time jobs, and 4 million full-time workers earned 
less than $6700  minimum wage earnings for a full year of work. 
Preliminary 1986 data indicate little change. Of those unemployed 
at some time during the prior year, 21.4 percent had family incomes 
below the poverty line. In contrast, the poverty rate for those 
without any unemployment was 5.4 percent. 1 Even those who work 
full time year-round are not assured a minimally acceptable living
1
2 CHAPTER 1
standard, as nearly two million such individuals were impoverished 
in 1985, up 44 percent from 1979.
The unemployment rate has crept upward over the past two 
decades, and economic and productivity growth has been sluggish 
since the 1973 OPEC oil embargo precipitated a major recession. 
The changing structure of American families has also augmented 
labor market hardships. While the entrance of more wives into the 
workforce has clearly benefited some families, increasing numbers 
of divorces and out-of-wedlock births have had a negative impact 
on family incomes. Single mothers and households of single persons 
and unrelated individuals tend to have significantly greater unem 
ployment and poverty problems than two-parent families.
A large proportion of unemployment and low earnings   as 
much as half or more over a decade-long period  is accounted for 
by a small proportion of individuals with lengthy unemployment 
spells or chronically low wages. 2 Deficient educational attainment is 
a major factor associated with employment problems. The mini 
mum education necessary to compete in the labor market has 
greatly increased in this century. However, according to a survey by 
the U.S. Department of Education, nearly 13 percent of adults in 
this country are functionally illiterate. 3 In 1984, adults with less 
than a high school education experienced over four times as much 
unemployment as those with four or more years of college, and the 
latter earned 2.5 times as much as the less educated group.4
Economic difficulties are also particularly concentrated among 
minorities, youth, and women who maintain families. The incidence 
of black unemployment and poverty is more than twice that of the 
rest of the population. While not quite as bleak, Hispanic unem 
ployment and poverty also far exceed that of the total population.
Of all age groups, youth are most vulnerable to unemployment. 
The level of teenage joblessness is about three times that of adults, 
and that of the 20-24 age group is 75 percent higher. Black youth 
joblessness is especially severe: only four of ten black teenagers are 
in the workforce, and of the remainder two of five are unemployed.
Unemployment in female-headed families is 70 percent higher 
than in married couple families, and the poverty rate is five times 
higher. More than half of the black and Hispanic women who
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maintain their families are poor. Almost one of every six families, 
and more than two of five black families, are headed by women.
The foregoing groups have traditionally experienced employment 
problems, but in recent years the problems of dislocated workers 
have also gained increasing attention. Increased foreign competi 
tion and a severe recession during the early 1980s eliminated large 
numbers of jobs in the goods-producing sector, especially in 
manufacturing. It is difficult to determine the exact causes of 
dislocation, but its unemployment impact is not in doubt. Between 
1981 and 1985, 10.8 million workers 20 years old and over lost their 
jobs due to layoffs from which they had not been recalled or to plant 
closings. A Bureau of Labor Statistics analysis of displaced workers 
who had three or more years job tenure found that only two-thirds 
were reemployed in January 1986. Eighteen percent were unem 
ployed, and the remaining 15 percent had dropped out of the labor 
force. As in the case of other jobless workers, the unskilled and 
deficiently educated displaced workers tended to fare worst. 5
The number of persons in need of job-related assistance repre 
sents a substantial proportion of the working age population. The 
following figures are not additive because of overlapping categories, 
but provide an idea of the dimensions of the problem:6
Characteristics Number
 (millions)
Total poor (16-64 years old) 17.8
Blacks (16-64) 4.4
Hispanics (16-64) 2.7
15-24 year olds 6.6
Single mothers (15-64) 3.3
High school dropouts (25-64) 23.6 
Dislocated workers (20-64) 3.1
Each of these groups may require different strategies to improve 
their employability. Young people, who tend to have little labor 
market experience, may benefit from learning basic job search skills. 
Disadvantaged youth without adequate skills can profit from 
programs providing high school equivalency or vocational training. 
The discrimination often faced by minorities may be overcome by
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partially subsidizing employers for on-the-job training costs and by 
government enforcement of equal opportunity laws. Women who 
maintain families frequently require child care assistance to success 
fully complete a training course. Displaced and older workers 
usually possess substantial work experience, and may only need job 
placement assistance. However, displaced employees who have 
worked for years in a now obsolete occupation may need to be 
retrained for an entirely new career.
The Expanding Federal Role
Although the federal government has promoted the welfare of the 
citizenry since the earliest years of the republic, sustained employ 
ment and training efforts focused on the disadvantaged emerged 
only a quarter century ago. Starting with a modest appropriation of 
$10 million under the Area Redevelopment Act of 1961, annual 
appropriations increased a thousandfold within two decades before 
declining during the 1980s (figure l.l). 7
Figure 1.1
Federal employment and training financing and services have 
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Persistent unemployment in the early 1960s resulted in the 
enactment of the Manpower Development and Training Act of
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1962, the first major expansion of federal training efforts. MDTA 
initially provided retraining for experienced workers dislocated by 
automation, but was later redirected toward the poor.
In 1963, congressional attention turned toward youth as the first 
baby boomers reached age 16 and began entering the labor force. 
Congress expanded support for a federal vocational education 
program that dated back to 1917.
The Great Society
In 1964 the nation's attention focused on the plight of the poor in 
response to President Lyndon Johnson's declared "war on pov 
erty." Economists were predicting that projected federal budget 
surpluses would impede economic growth. What better way to 
spend the surpluses than to help build a better society? As part of its 
antipoverty efforts, the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act created 
two new youth employment programs: the Job Corps, a residential 
training program; and the Neighborhood Youth Corps, providing 
work experience. Work experience was also used to help needy 
adults, including public assistance recipients. Adopting the notion 
that the wearer, not the cobbler, knows where the shoe pinches, the 
legislation favored "maximum feasible participation" of the poor in 
setting program policy. The institutional result was the emergence 
of community action agencies and community-based organizations 
as advocates for the poor and deliverers of services, including 
employment and training assistance.
Meanwhile, the unemployment rate remained stuck between 5 
and 6 percent throughout 1963 and the first half of 1964 — a rate 
considered high at that time. Post World War II economic text 
books had preached that a tax cut — without an offsetting 
reduction in government expenditures — would help reduce unem 
ployment by stimulating demand for the purchase of goods and 
services. In 1964, Congress tested this theory, cutting federal 
personal and corporate income taxes by approximately $14 billion 
while moderately increasing expenditures. The action was strikingly 
successful. Unemployment declined to 5 percent by the end of the 
year, and further dropped to 4.5 percent by the summer of 1965 on 
the heels of a $5 billion excise tax cut, when deficit spending to 
finance the Vietnam War took over as the engine for job creation.
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By 1965, America's reemergent social conscience addressed the 
needs of the physically and mentally handicapped, millions of 
whom were unable to effectively compete in the labor market. The 
federal government had previously enacted a comprehensive reha 
bilitation program for World War II and Korean War veterans; 
new legislation expanded federal vocational rehabilitation efforts 
for other disabled persons.
In 1966, Congress experimented with small public jobs programs 
for adults not on welfare, the first such efforts since the Great 
Depression. New Careers trained the poor and undereducated for 
paraprofessional jobs, and Operation Mainstream employed older 
rural residents at conservation tasks. New Careers failed partly 
because the training required a long-term commitment and because 
of resistance by professionals protective of their jobs and status. 
Operation Mainstream limped along with limited funding until it 
mushroomed into a more comprehensive, multibillion dollar public 
service employment program five years later. Also in 1966, the 
Adult Education Act initiated federal educational assistance for 
high school dropouts and illiterate adults.
Attention turned in 1967 to welfare recipients. Despite strong 
economic growth since the early 1960s, Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children program recipients had almost doubled since 
the beginning of the decade. The cry was raised that if the program 
continued to grow at this rate, we would all be driven into the 
poorhouse. Congress responded with the Work Incentive Program, 
called WIN for short (the acronym WIP was shunned). Work 
experience and supportive services would enable welfare recipients 
to secure jobs, economic independence and — as some members of 
Congress hoped — "get 'em off our backs."
Government efforts notwithstanding, unemployment in many 
inner cities remained a serious problem. Dozens of riots broke out 
in the mid-1960s, from Watts to Detroit to the nation's capital. One 
result was the Concentrated Employment Program of 1967, which 
put antipoverty and training funds in the hands of mayors, county 
officials, and community-based organizations to boost job oppor 
tunities in poor neighborhoods.
Until 1968, the Great Society's employment and training initia 
tives had been designed almost entirely by federal agencies. With
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rising social unrest, the private sector began to pay increasing 
attention to inner city conditions. President Johnson, seizing upon 
this concern, created the National Alliance of Businessmen — the 
"men" was later dropped — to encourage employers to accept 
direct responsibility for combating discrimination and poverty.
However, by the last year of the Johnson administration, the 
political pressure to ameliorate the lot the of poor had crested. 
Economic growth and new government initiatives helped reduce 
poverty substantially in the 1960s, but dreams of total victory had 
proven illusory.
Nixon and the Comprehensive 
Employment and Training Act
The Nixon administration came to power with only one positive 
commitment in the employment and training field: to consolidate 
and at the same time decentralize the diverse programs which had 
emerged during the 1960s. Congress was prepared to accept this 
approach only if it was accompanied by a public sector job creation 
program. The administration, however, strongly opposed what it 
considered "make work" jobs.
The recession of 1970-1 and the approaching presidential elec 
tions generated sufficient political pressure to induce President 
Nixon to sign the 1971 Emergency Employment Act authorizing a 
public employment program. A $2.25 billion appropriation allowed 
state and local governments and nonprofit organizations to hire 
some 150,000 unemployed persons.
Nixon's support of public employment was short-lived. Follow 
ing his 1972 landslide reelection, Nixon attempted to dismantle the 
Great Society. Watergate intervened, however, and amid a period 
of disarray in the executive branch the Labor Department negoti 
ated directly with Congress to create the Comprehensive Employment 
and Training Act (GETA). Enacted in December 1973, the CETA 
compromise called for locally-managed but federally-funded train 
ing and public sector job creation programs. After years of debate 
over the appropriate scope and locus of service delivery, Congress 
gave local governments broad discretion to tailor job training 
programs to community needs. CETA also authorized a standby
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public service employment program, to be implemented whenever 
national and local unemployment rates rose too high. Although 
most programs were to be managed at the local or state level, the 
federal government continued to operate the Job Corps for youth 
and programs for Indians and farmworkers.
CETA began under the least propitious circumstances, arriving 
simultaneously with the OPEC oil embargo which quadrupled 
crude oil prices and induced a recession. The new employment and 
training program was overwhelmed by unemployment, which 
climbed from a 5 percent rate at the beginning of 1974 to over 7 
percent by December. President Gerald Ford reluctantly agreed to 
a new public service employment program, shifting CETA's focus 
toward job creation rather than training. Unemployment peaked at
9 percent in the spring of 1975 and averaged 7.7 percent in the 1976 
election year. Ford acquiesced to a congressional extension of the 
public service employment program shortly before the election, but 
vetoed Democratic efforts to further increase funds for job creation.
A Major Expansion Under Carter
In 1977, the executive reins returned to the Democrats, who after 
eight years out of power vigorously promoted new employment and 
training initiatives. The Youth Employment and Demonstration 
Projects Act of 1977 (YEDPA), expanded funding for public service 
jobs, and employment tax credits were quickly enacted. Together 
these programs constituted a major if short-lived commitment of 
resources to combat unemployment.
The New Jobs Tax Credit of 1977 offered employers incentives 
for expanding their workforce. In its brief two-year lifespan, over 
$4 billion in tax expenditures boosted overall employment. The 
program was not restricted to the disadvantaged.
The highest priority, however, was to ameliorate unemployment 
among poor youths. YEDPA was a combination of traditional 
work experience and skill training programs with experimental 
research projects. Another innovation directed primarily toward 
youths was the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit of 1978 (TJTC). Similar to 
the expiring New Jobs Tax Credit, TJTC offered employers a 
substantial tax credit for employing poor youths and other impov 
erished individuals.
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Another major employment initiative of the Carter administra 
tion was an expansion of public service employment under CETA 
from 300,000 to 750,000 job slots in nine months. The pressure to 
quickly fill these jobs resulted in isolated, though highly publicized, 
cases of careless management and enrollment of ineligible appli 
cants that were to haunt CETA for the rest of its limited life.
The last major employment and training development during the 
Carter administration was a 1978 revision of CETA. Amendments 
reduced the discretionary authority of state and local governments, 
confined eligibility for public service employment to the poor, and 
initiated a new training program which involved private sector 
representatives in program planning and implementation. The 
changes improved the operations of CETA and addressed concerns 
of financial mismanagement, but did little to boost the program's 
image.
The Job Training Partnership Act
In a clear break with past federal policy, President Reagan 
mounted a concerted effort to sharply cut employment and training 
spending along with other antipoverty programs. CETA public 
service jobs were eliminated in 1981 with little dissent, as exagger 
ated and highly publicized abuses had undermined the program's 
support. Negative images of public employment as "make-work, 
dead-end" jobs had triumphed. Reagan administration appointees 
ignored evidence that supported the program, and confidently 
predicted that the private sector would reabsorb displaced public 
service employees. However, later studies showed that these indi 
viduals experienced severe reemployment problems.8
CETA's scheduled September 1982 expiration prompted a 
lengthy debate over the act's remaining job training sections.9 By 
early 1982, three major proposals emerged. House Democrats 
favored a program similar to CETA, but with increased business 
involvement. The Reagan administration favored terminating the 
program and shifting the responsibility to states and localities. As 
an interim step, however, the administration supported a block 
grant arrangement with federal financing but state control over
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program operations. The Senate Republicans' compromise solution 
favored continued federal oversight with a substantial delegation of 
authority to states and business officials.
As the recession deepened and unemployment rose, Congress 
balked at the administration's proposal to end federal support of 
job training assistance. The debate then shifted to the design of a 
new program, centering on four contentious issues: how much 
should be spent; whether enrollees should be given cash assistance 
as well as training; the proper division of authority among federal, 
state and local government; and the degree of business involvement.
Although the jobless rate was approaching 9 percent, President 
Reagan's budget, introduced in January 1982, recommended $2.4 
billion for job training, only a fourth of the amount appropriated 
prior to his election. Senators Dan Quayle and Edward Kennedy 
proposed a bipartisan bill carrying a price tag of $3.8 billion. 
Representative Augustus Hawkins offered a $5.4 billion proposal, 
but a cost conscious House reserved only $3 billion for job training. 
In the final legislation, Congress evaded the funding issue by 
allocating "such sums as may be necessary" for JTPA. The only 
exception was the widely praised Job Corps program, budgeted at 
$618 million for fiscal 1983. Subsequently, Congress appropriated 
$3.7 billion for JTPA's first full year.
The House Democratic bill initially proposed reviving public 
service employment. Because of adamant administration opposi 
tion, the Democrats decided to strike the job creation proposal to 
facilitate passage of the training bill. Once this concession was made 
the issue of income support payments to trainees became para 
mount. The Democrats considered stipends to trainees and other 
support services, such as child care for mothers with young 
children, essential to sustain trainees with little or no outside 
income. But the administration countered that by devoting over 
half of its training budget to cash payments and support services, 
CETA became a disguised welfare program, and the president 
insisted on limiting outlays exclusively to training and administra 
tive expenditures. The bitter controversy peaked when the House 
threatened to enact a simple extension of CETA if the administra 
tion refused to compromise. Faced with nearly 10 percent unem 
ployment and congressional elections a month away, the adminis-
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tration relented. The compromise required that local job training 
sponsors spend at least 70 percent of their allocation for training. 
No more than 15 percent could be devoted to administration. A 
limit of 30 percent was applied to support services and administra 
tion combined. The limitations could be waived if a locality suffered 
high unemployment, faced unusually high child care or transporta 
tion costs, or offered lengthy training courses.
The appropriate division of responsibility between federal, state 
and local government has been debated since the federal govern 
ment first enacted job training legislation. Under the initial CETA 
legislation, local elected officials were largely responsible for pro 
gram administration. Rising unemployment and program abuses — 
greatly exaggerated by the media — stimulated greater federal 
intervention, but by the early 1980s the administration sought to 
eliminate federal responsibility entirely, prompting an ideological 
debate between advocates of sustained federal involvement and 
those who favored a passive federal role. The administration and 
Senate Republicans proposed to delegate most of the federal 
government's administrative authority to state governors. House 
Democrats favored continuing the CETA model, which divided 
administrative responsibility between federal and local authorities. 
Although the state role under CETA was minor, inexperience was 
not necessarily a drawback because governors were not stigmatized 
by CETA's widely publicized abuses. The National Governors' 
Association lobbied hard for expanded state responsibility. In 
response the local governments which had administered CETA — 
represented by the National Association of Counties, the U.S. 
Conference of Mayors, and the National League of Cities — argued 
that President Reagan's federalist principles should naturally cause 
him to favor administration by the government closest to the 
people. Out of this struggle emerged a somewhat ambiguous 
compromise which ensured that the question of program authority 
would not be settled until JTPA got underway. Although significant 
responsibilities were retained at the federal level, the law delegated 
most oversight duties to state governors. To facilitate state author 
ity, 22 percent of the funds for JTPA's largest training program and 
all dislocated worker financing were allocated directly to the
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governors. Decisions on who should be served and how to serve 
them were left to local administrators, within the limits of the law.
Another thorny administrative issue concerned the role of busi 
ness representatives. Apart from offering on-the-job training, busi 
ness was hardly involved in federal employment and training 
programs until CETA's 1978 reauthorization created a Private 
Sector Initiative Program (PSIP) and established private industry 
councils (PICs) to advise local programs. Job placement rates were 
higher under PSIP than CETA programs administered by local 
governments, probably because PSIP served a more qualified 
clientele. However, the National Alliance of Business and the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce argued that the PSIP experience proved the 
importance of business leadership in building a successful job 
training program. The idea found ready acceptance in an adminis 
tration which fervently believed that business was inherently more 
efficient than the government. However, the claims made on behalf 
of business involvement were not universally shared. Arguing that 
employers were primarily interested in maximizing profits and 
largely disinterested in hiring the poor, opponents contended that 
the potential benefits of business involvement were greatly exagger 
ated. Expanded business authority was also contested by the 
various interest groups representing local elected officials.
Each of the three major job training bills offered as a substitute 
for CETA in 1982 envisioned an enlarged employer role. However, 
the administration and Senate proposals went much further than 
the House Democratic bill, which would have largely retained the 
authority of local elected officials. The final JTPA compromise gave 
business greatly increased power at the local level, but attempted to 
ensure that employer representatives and elected officials would be 
equal partners in designing and administering local programs. The 
PICs were transformed from an advisory to a policymaking council 
with a required majority of business representatives. Local training 
plans had to be jointly approved by the PICs and local elected 
officials, with disputes resolved by the governor.
Despite the general emphasis on reduced spending, the addition 
of a new program for retraining dislocated workers was not 
controversial. The problem of dislocated workers was viewed as 
increasingly acute during the early 1980s because of increased
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foreign economic competition, the continued relative decline in 
manufacturing employment, and the deepening recession. Although 
many dislocated workers had previously possessed good jobs, the 
difficulty they experienced in regaining employment was thought to 
justify federal intervention.
Several other new features in JTPA were also added with 
relatively little controversy. The most important of these concerned 
performance standards, or numerical criteria used to assess local 
program success by gauging job placement rates, participants' 
earnings and training costs, among other factors. Performance 
standards had evolved under CETA, but JTPA instituted manda 
tory national targets. The law established monetary awards for 
successful programs and sanctions against localities which per 
formed poorly.
Congress also supported increased coordination between job 
training and related social programs. This objective was not new, 
but it did receive increased attention during the 1982 debate. JTPA 
incorporated amendments promoting coordination between JTPA 
and public employment offices and welfare programs. The law 
vested principal responsibility for coordination with the governor's 
office and allocated funds directly to governors for coordination 
activities under JTPA's principal training program.
Congress adopted two other significant administrative provisions 
designed to avoid problems which had plagued CETA. JTPA was 
authorized as a permanent program to eliminate wrenching qua 
drennial reauthorization debates. Second, to provide localities with 
adequate lead time to plan the coming year's expenditures, JTPA's 
operating year was scheduled to begin in the July following the start 
of the federal government's fiscal year in October. For example, 
JTPA program year 1988 begins July 1, 1988 and ends June 30, 
1989; the federal fiscal year 1988 begins on October 1,1987.* CETA 
local planners often were not informed of their allocation until the 
fiscal year was underway because Congress made belated decisions 
on appropriations.
Although JTPA's passage was marked by extended and heated 
debate, the political and economic climate during 1982 made it
*Following JTPA's practice, references to years in this study denote program years.
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reasonably certain that a federal job training program would be 
enacted. Rising unemployment and the approaching 1982 mid-term 
election placed enormous pressure on the nation's leaders. From a 
trough of 7 percent in mid-1981, the unemployment rate exceeded 
10 percent by the fall of 1982. Once Congress approved JTPA, 
President Reagan's initial opposition to continued federal support 
of training did not prevent him from claiming credit for a program 
he had long opposed.
Like GET A, JTPA encompasses a number of separate programs. 
The centerpiece of the law is Title II, which provides training grants 
to states, a summer jobs program for youth, and set-aside funds for 
education and older worker programs. Title III addresses the needs 
of workers dislocated due to foreign competition or technological 
change. Title IV continues a variety of GET A programs whose 
administration remains the direct responsibility of the federal 
government. These include the Job Corps as well as programs 







Title IIA Adult and youth programs 1,840 
State education coordination
and grants 147 
Training programs for older
individuals 55
Title IIB Summer youth programs (1988) 750 
Title III Dislocated worker programs 200
Title IV Federally administered programs 866 
Job Corps 656 
Native American programs 62 
Migrant and seasonal
farmworker programs 60 
Veterans' employment programs 10 
Technical assistance, research, 
______and pilot projects______________________79
Source: Congressional appropriations
The Job Training Partnership Act 15
JTPA's character was more strongly influenced by the political 
and economic climate of the early 1980s than by drawing on the 
experience of two decades of federal employment and training 
programs. Studies of GET A demonstrated that the program was 
generally a success and not a debacle. 10 Rather than reforming 
CETA, however, Congress chose to overhaul the system. Most of 
JTPA's new elements — state and business leadership, the prohibi 
tion of public service jobs, and radically reduced income support 
payments — were inspired more by faith than evidence. The heart 
of the program, the type of training which enrollees receive, was 
virtually ignored during the legislative debate. Whatever the merits 
of the law that emerged, the torch was passed to the new public- 
private partnership.
